The development and international diffusion of total quality management (TQM) as a normative theory are examined. It is shown that the main concepts associated with TQM contain an implicit Darwinist view of society made up only of institutions struggling to survive against increasingly ruthless competition. It is also shown that their development was the result of a process in which universities, large corporations, and government interacted to develop a response to the increasingly serious economic challenge that Japan presented to the United States from the 1960s to the mid-1980s. The TQM paradigm was taken up by U.S. multinational corporations and the leading business and management schools of the United States and disseminated throughout the world. It is concluded that TQM has an ideological dimension designed to help diffuse to private and public service institutions throughout the world the dominant U.S. view of society and economy at the end of the twentieth century.
Introduction
TQM, a concept that originated in the United States in the late 1980s from studies of Japanese management methods, was subsequently widely adopted throughout the world as a normative management theory, the "one best way" to manage enterprises. This article examines this interplay of economics, politics, and culture in the development and international diffusion of TQM. It may therefore be considered as an exercise in the history of ideas. However, in our methodology, ideas are viewed not merely as a product of previous ideas but also as the outcome of the particular social, economic, and political circumstances in which they are developed. This is the methodology we consider best suited to an understanding of the reasons certain ideas acquire acceptance by those yielding power and are subsequently used as a normative tools.
When used in this normative way, the theory is presented as a value-free technical device to achieve desirable goals. The article questions this assumption. The main concepts associated with TQM are analyzed, and it is shown that far from being value free, they contain an implicit Darwinist view in which society is viewed as being made up only of institutions acting like organic systems struggling to survive against increasingly ruthless competition in an external world ruled exclusively by market relations.
The academic roots of TQM in the pre-World War II work of U.S. academics, which created the statistical quality control (SQC) movement in the United States, are traced. The subsequent adoption and development of these ideas by the Japanese in the 1950s and 1960s are examined in the context of the well-known and successful national strategy by Japan that sought to learn, adopt, and adapt from the West the knowledge and practice that were useful in establishing its own distinct approach to industrial and technological development.
The final set of concepts and values associated with TQM is then shown to be the result of a process in which universities, large corporations, and government interacted to develop a response to the increasingly serious economic challenge that Japan presented to the United States in the world markets from the 1960s to the mid-1980s.
It was following the adoption of the term total quality management as a result of the setting up in the United States of the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award that TQM came to be presented as normative theory and was widely adopted by firms and other institutions as the "best way" management approach that would enable the Japanese challenge to be overcome. This paradigm was also taken up by the leading business and management schools of the United States and disseminated throughout the world by them and by universities in other countries.
The article concludes that TQM has an ideological dimension. It diffused to all U.S. national institutions, including public service organizations, as a constituent part of the dominant view of society and economy at the end of the twentieth century. It also spread throughout the world through the training of business elites by the U.S. business schools and through the demonstration effect that they have on the academic institutions of other less powerful countries. In adopting TQM uncritically from U.S. business schools as a technocratic tool to achieve "quality" in their own courses, universities' countries are spreading an ideology that favors the global interests of the United States and that undermines notions of public service and social solidarity in achieving reductions in inequality. The adoption and adaptation by the Japanese of ideas of U.S. academics Shewhart, Juran, and Deming in the 1950s and 1960s, a time when their influence in the United States was still marginal, may have made a significant contribution to Japanese economic development. The uncritical wholesale adoption of a seemingly economic and cultural context-free and "universal" TQM model by institutions in less developed countries must be seen as a continuation of the dependency syndrome whereby less developed countries adopt ideas and technologies from the dominant countries without questioning their appropriateness to local circumstances (Palma 1981, inter alia) .
The diffusion of TQM to the management of the universities themselves, both in the United States and elsewhere, is also part of a process of breaking down notions of public service and of submitting the production of knowledge to the exigencies of the market. This undermines the concepts of academic freedom and universal knowledge traditionally cherished by academics. It is important for universities to resist this and to defend their right to remain independent institutions dedicated to the ethos of public service, critical reflection, and universal knowledge.
Part 1: What Is TQM?
The concept of TQM can be understood on one level as a proposal to place some academic approaches to quality control (QC) in manufacturing industry at the center of the management of the enterprise. The achievement of quality should be the main purpose of the organization and of everyone working within it. The justification for this lies in the fact that quality is variously defined as the "fitness for use" of the product (Juran 1991) or the ability of the product "to satisfy the needs of the customer" (Deming 1986 ). This definition of quality at the center of thinking within the enterprise implicitly makes the customer its central focus, and the organization becomes "customer driven" as opposed to "producer driven," as the modern management jargon puts it.
The concept of TQM was developed in the same historical context as flexibility theories and shares with these the implicit view that mass markets had become saturated and that to survive, the modern firm needed to respond closely to the requirements of niche markets and even of the individual customer. In current market conditions, competition is intense, and success is predicated on a quality strategy that will differentiate the firm from its competitors and that is either product driven or process driven, or both. In a product-driven quality strategy, the competitive advantage of the company is provided by the unique ability of the product to satisfy the requirements of the customer. In a process-driven strategy, the focus is on lowering costs through improved process quality and efficiency (Warner 1996) . While TQM per se does not explicitly address the issue of productivity, a key issue for most companies, it is implicitly present in the focus on process quality and its relationship to cost and efficiency.
The main responsibility for driving the TQM philosophy lies with the management of the organization, who must provide leadership at all levels, starting at the very top. The aim of supervision should be to motivate rather than to control (Deming 1986) . However, quality is the responsibility of everyone in the organization and should be devolved downwards as far as possible. To ensure that everyone accepts responsibility for quality as previously defined, all should be encouraged to see themselves as customers, even inside the same company. A company therefore has both external and internal customers. A manufacturing department is the customer of the engineering department that produces the design, and a worker on the assembly line becomes the customer of the preceding worker. Even a worker-manager relationship can be conceived of as a two-way supplier-customer relationship. The "customer/supplier quality chain" thus becomes a central concept of TQM (Warner 1996) . Because everyone is responsible for quality, defined to include process and therefore, implicitly, efficiency, productivity becomes a concern for everyone. The question of the intensity of work under TQM is no longer the sole responsibility of management but is internalized by the workforce. However, the implicit nature of the relationship is insufficient for the purposes of some management thinking that prefers to differentiate timebased management from TQM. The former category, while compatible with TQM, focuses on reducing time to market, product cycle times, and inventories (flexibility, just in time). However, time-based management is still seen as part of the general quality drive (Warner 1996) .
The improvement of quality must be a continuous process. A central aim of quality strategies should be to "create a culture of continuous improvement in all aspects of the business" (European Foundation for Quality Management 1989, 80) . Improvements must be continuously monitored and measured (both through self-assessment and in relation to external benchmarks) and fed back to the workforce to achieve increased motivation for further improvement (Warner 1996) . For the main advocates of TQM, however, while the quest for survival in the marketplace against the external competition drives the company, within it there is only room for cooperation. Barriers between departments should be broken down, and "people in research, design and sales and production must work as a team" (Deming 1986 ). Strict divisions of labor and job demarcation by skill should disappear, and workers in teams should be multiskilled. Internal competition must be abolished.
Presented in this abstract, ahistorical way, TQM becomes a value-free and positive prescriptive theory to help management create a successful enterprise applicable anywhere in the world. It seems to contradict fundamentally the spirit of Taylorism and scientific management by stressing the need to remove barriers that rob workers and managers of their right to pride of workmanship (Deming 1986) , cooperation, and teamwork and giving management a role of leading rather than controlling.
Yet TQM is far from value free. The values underpinning TQM derive from extensive use of the Darwinian metaphor. The key proponents of TQM often couch their discourse in Darwinian terminology. The enterprise is seen as analogous to a biological system struggling for survival in a hostile competitive environment. For Deming, for instance, the company must be managed as a system, and the system is seen as a network of interdependent components that work together to try and accomplish its aims (Wieseltier 1993 , quoted in Dennis 1995 . Cooperation is therefore limited to working toward the aims of the enterprise/system as provided by its leadership. All individual or collective existence is to be limited to those aspects that serve the needs of the enterprise. They will accept no dissent or dissonance because we cannot afford the destructive effects of competition. . . . We must throw overboard the idea that competition is a necessary way of life. . . . [I am opposed] to the evils of the merit system . . . because it sets individuals against each other and motivates them wrongly, selfishly. (Deming 1986 , quoted in Dennis 1995 On the other hand, transformation in any organisation will take place under a leader. It will not be spontaneous. . . . The job of a leader is to accomplish transformation of his [sic] organisation. He [sic] possesses knowledge, personality and persuasive power. . . . Quality is determined by the top management. It cannot be delegated. (Deming 1993 , quoted in Dennis 1995 Juran ([1951] 1998) likewise advised that "upper managers must personally lead the effort. . . . In successful companies, upper managers virtually took charge of quality by accepting personal responsibility for the critical decisions and actions described earlier" (p. 84).
Part 2: TQM as a Product of History
The ideological function of TQM can perhaps best be understood by considering its history. The origins of the TQM concept can be traced back to its intellectual roots in the United States, primarily in the work on statistical control, the seminal publication of which was the 1931 book by Walter Shewhart, a researcher at AT&T's Bell Laboratories, titled The Economic Quality of Manufactured Products. This introduced the concept of SQC as opposed to quality inspection, which had been the central approach to quality of Taylor's scientific management (Warner 1996; Cusumano 1985) . Other early prominent contributors to this school included W. Edwards Deming, a Ph.D. in theoretical physics from Yale, who worked for the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Census Bureau between 1927 and 1946 as an expert on statistical sampling and who had collaborated with Shewhart for a time (Cusumano 1985) . While this early work was influential, giving rise to the SQC movement in which leading firms such as Western Electric were involved (Cusumano 1985) , it was far from being the main approach of U.S. industry. Critical aspects of Shewhart's thinking were misunderstood, in particular his wish that the use of statistical charts be guided by economic principles and applied selectively. As a result of the indiscriminate use of these charts by industry, they were soon thought to be unhelpful and dropped (Kondo 1993) .
The Japanese Contribution
Before it became incorporated in the official ideology of TQM and spread worldwide, QC first underwent empirical transformation and adaptation in post-World War II Japanese industry, followed by further abstraction and theorization by U.S. academics and industrial consultants, carried out by, among others, some of the originators of the SQC movement.
Immediately following the defeat of Japan in World War II, U.S. policy was to help Japan modernize and democratize its society. A program of reform sought to break up the prewar, family-based industrial conglomerates, the zaibatsu, and to allow trade unions to organize. By 1947, however, the policy changed in the run up to the cold war, and priority was given to strengthening Japanese capitalism as a bulwark against the spread of communism. The prewar zaibatsu were allowed to regroup, this time around banks rather than families, and were led by a younger generation of technocrats, to form what became known as the keiretsu. Japanese industry, however, remained in a slump until the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, which brought close to a billion dollars in war procurements to Japanese industry. This allowed key industries to modernize, starting with the steel industry (Shorrock 1983b) .
The issue of the quality of Japanese industrial goods had been highlighted early on by the occupying U.S. forces. As Cusumano (1985) pointed out, while GHQ wanted to aid the recovery of Japan's economy, it also needed to produce electrical equipment, trucks and other items up to American standards for U.S. troops stationed in Japan and Korea. . . . NEC, Toshiba, Fuji Electric, and Hitachi were the first Japanese companies to apply American production and QC techniques. (P. 321)
The issue of quality, however, also fits well with the interests of the new modernizing, technocratic elite in Japan. The strategic position of Japan in relation to the emerging U.S. cold war policy gave them considerable autonomy and bargaining power in relation to the occupiers. Japan was therefore able to begin to develop an independent approach to industrial development building on its own historical and nationalistic traditions. The government played a strong role in directing the strategy, particularly through the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). They followed the example of the earlier modernization of Japan that took place after the Meiji restoration of 1868 by adopting a policy of learning from the West, now aided by their new relationship with the United States (Allen 1981) .
This coincidence of interests was demonstrated in practice when W. Edwards Deming was invited to Japan in 1950 by the U.S. Army GHQ and lectured on an eight-day course in QC organized by the Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers (JUSE) and in several QC seminars held throughout the country under the auspices of the Japan Management Association and the Japan Standards Association (Cusumano 1985; Kondo 1993) . At this stage, Deming's ideas derived mainly from the U.S. 1930s SQC movement and still included the scientific management-inspired advocacy of a separate inspection department (Bank and Wilpert 1983) .
JUSE became a major vehicle for disseminating awareness of the importance of QC. In 1949, it formed a QC research group and opened a six-month basic QC course that was subsequently repeated hundreds of times, training many thousands of Japanese industrial engineers. JUSE also became the secretariat that administered the prestigious annual Deming Prize established in 1951 to mark the impact that Deming's visit had on Japan.
Preventing Internal Dissent
As we have demonstrated, TQM culture requires that every member of the enterprise owe allegiance to its aims as devised by its leadership. It brooks no dissent and requires that any trade unions act strictly within the parameters set by the senior management. Contrary to the widely accepted view that Japanese workers are naturally inclined to accept leadership and authority because of their Confucian beliefs, strong independent trade unions developed rapidly following the democratic reforms introduced by the occupying U.S. authorities. After the change in U.S. policy, however, a U.S. banker was brought in 1948 to impose an austerity budget on the country, including a rationalization of industry. As a result, thousands of redundancies were caused, and widespread strikes were organized in response by these new trade unions (Shorrock 1983b) . Taming the unions became an important policy goal. The militant leadership of the steel workers union was removed during the Korean War, but the key event in establishing in the car industry the kind of labor relations required by the TQM culture was the famous Nissan one-hundred-day strike in 1953. During this strike, workers were locked out, and several hundred were fired. With the collaboration of the Japanese government and the U.S. authorities, several trade union leaders were arrested. The union was finally defeated and replaced by a company union. Nissan's Zama automobile plant was sited thirty-five miles southeast of Tokyo, near the major U.S. Army depot at Sagamihara (Shorrock 1983a) .
The social conditions were now created to begin the development of a specifically Japanese approach to QC, continuing the adaptation of U.S. academic work to Japanese circumstances. J. M. Juran, another of the founding fathers of the modern quality movement, visited Japan in 1954 and taught JUSE organized courses for top-and middle-management personnel. This was important in starting to bring the issue of quality to the attention of senior management (Kondo 1993). Juran had started to argue that QC had to be considered in the context of the general management task and should involve line managers as well as quality inspection specialists. His intervention led JUSE to start a campaign to involve senior management in quality issues, with in-company training, nationwide radio courses, and the publication of a series of pamphlets (Bank and Wilpert 1983) . Cusumano (1985) , however, ascribed the start of the theoretical strand that began to move quality from the production engineering and inspection departments into the mainstream of management thinking to Feigenbaum, who introduced the term total quality control in an autumn 1956 issue of the Harvard Business Review. In his book, Total Quality Control: Engineering and Management, translated into Japanese in the same year, Feigenbaum (1961) argued that QC programs should focus on defect prevention rather than inspection and that managers should make quality the responsibility of the workers. He also encouraged firms "to set up TQC [total quality control] systems that involved all departments and aimed at satisfying consumer definitions of quality" (Cusumano 1985, 326) . Cusumano also argued that these ideas, like Deming's, had more impact in Japan than in the United States. They were taken up but significantly adapted by senior industrial management in Japan and became an important component of management approaches during the rapid industrial growth that took off in the 1960s. The Japanese approach abandoned what was found to be methodologies to involve the whole company and all employees in the quest for quality. They also developed the concept of quality circles, first suggested by Ichikawa in a key article published in 1963 in a national magazine titled "Quality Control for Foremen." In this article, Ichikawa recommended that foremen establish book-reading circles within their work groups to promote quality concerns. This suggestion was taken up nationwide, and quality circles became an important component of Japanese quality management, going beyond the theoretical study suggested by Ichikawa and tackling practical problems (Bank and Wilpert 1983) . This was facilitated by the compliant behavior of the company unions since quality circles met in the workers' own time.
Quality Moves Center Stage

The Rise of the Japanese Challenge
Japanese industrial development and modernization started in the immediate postwar period, initially with priority to the steel, shipbuilding, chemicals, nonferrous metals, and oil industries. It expanded into consumer goods in the 1960s following a government strategy of export-oriented industrialization, with the government planning, encouraging, and directing through the Economic Planning Agency set up in 1955 and MITI. MITI in particular oversaw rapid technological modernization by firms learning and adapting from abroad (Fransman 1988; Van der Wee 1986 ). The rapid rate of growth achieved by the Japanese was facilitated by a number of factors, both endogenous and exogenous. Among the exogenous factors we have already stressed was the favorable position of Japan in the global cold war strategy of the United States, which was strengthened directly and indirectly first by the Korean (1950-53) and then by the Vietnam (1954-75) Wars. Japanese growth was impressive and far outstripped that of the U.S. economy. In the 1960s and 1970s, Japanese exports of manufactured goods grew extremely fast, significantly challenging the world dominance of the United States in key sectors. More worrying in many ways for U.S. industrialists and policy makers was the penetration of the U.S. domestic market by Japanese goods. During the 1970s, the U.S. trade gap with Japan increased from approximately U.S.$2.3 billion in 1971 to approximately U.S.$38.8 billion in 1981 (Hill 1983 ). Japanese car production increased rapidly from 1.2 percent of world production in 1960 to 24.1 percent in 1980. During the same period, the U.S. share declined from 51.4 percent to 21.8 percent. In 1981, U.S.$9.5 billion in cars were exported from Japan to the United States, more than twice the total U.S. global car exports of U.S.$4.026 billion. Exports to the U.S. accounted for just more than half of the total value of Japanese car exports (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 1983).
According to Cusumano (1985) , the issue of quality in the Japanese car industry became particularly important starting from the 1970s because of the priority given to exports. During this period, Feigenbaum's theoretical ideas about focusing quality on prevention rather than inspection and on involving the whole company in this process were put into practice at Toyota and Nissan and were extended down the supply chain to the relationship with subcontractors. They were helped in this by the new tame company unions now often led by people who had temporarily been seconded from management functions (Shorrock 1983a) .
The challenge provided by Japan in the area of semiconductors was perhaps even more worrying for the United States. The semiconductor industry had by the end of the 1970s acquired a major strategic significance since it was by then obvious that semiconductor devices would be incorporated into most industrial products, including military ones. Semiconductor-based integrated circuits were also driving the fast rate of technical change in the computer industry.
Information technology in general and semiconductors in particular had been chosen by Japan's MITI as a priority sector for development, with the ministry coordinating R&D and export policy for the industry. With the 1982 256K generation of memory (DRAM) chips, the Japanese had achieved technical parity with the United States and technical superiority by 1985. By 1982, the Japanese had captured 70 percent of the world market in 64K memory chips, then at the mature stage of the product life cycle. Intel had by then dropped out of DRAM production altogether (Ferguson 1985) .
The U.S. Reaction: The Birth of TQM
Concern about the challenge of Japan to U.S. goods both in the world markets and in the U.S. domestic market increased greatly from the 1970s onward. Concern changed to near panic at the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s as the impact of the Japanese exports overlapped with the effects of a world recession that strongly affected the United States. The number of workers in the U.S. car industry dropped from 802,800 in 1978 to 487,700 in January 1983. In 1979, the U.S. car industry suffered a severe shock when Chrysler, the smallest of America's big three car manufacturers, was on the verge of bankruptcy and had to be rescued by a government loan of U.S.$1.5 billion (Locke 1996) . Even in the fast-growing semiconductor sector, the loss of jobs made itself felt.
The political response to this crisis was orchestrated through a complex interaction between the major industry players and the political institutions, including Congress and the U.S. government. The industries blamed Japan for unfair competition because of the protection of the Japanese domestic markets. Japan was also accused of "dumping" practices. This led to the demand that the U.S. government impose import controls on Japanese goods, first developed by the United Automobile Workers trade union in the mid1970s and taken up by two of the big three car manufacturers, Ford and Chrysler (Nelson 1994) . This approach was also vigorously pursued by the semiconductor manufacturers through the Semiconductor Industry Association, which had been formed partly to respond to the Japanese challenge (Irwin 1994) .
Concern with the foreign challenge had also become a major preoccupation of government and U.S. policy makers independent of the lobbying activities of the industries as far back as the 1960s when the CIA set up its Office of Economic Research in response to the growing economic strength of Japan and of Europe (Kelly 1983) . As a result of the late 1970s crisis, the Reagan administration, elected on a free-trade platform, came under heavy pressure from the auto manufacturers and from Congress to impose import controls on Japanese cars. Nelson, in a detailed study of the car industry's attitude to trade politics, regarded the administration as split between committed free traders and those who put the interests of U.S. big business above ideology. Among the latter group was Secretary of Sate for Commerce Malcolm Baldridge. The supporters of big business gained the upper hand, and in 1981, the administration effectively forced the Japanese to limit their exports to the United States to 1.68 million cars a year, a reduction of 7.7 percent on the previous period (Nelson 1994) . Trade in the strategic semiconductor sector experienced even greater government intervention, largely as a result of direct industry lobbying. The U.S. Department of Commerce and Secretary of State Baldridge were once again closely involved in drawing up the 1986 trade agreement in which the United States forced Japan to end the dumping of semiconductors in all world markets and to guarantee 20 percent of the Japanese domestic semiconductor market for non-Japanese firms. These provisions were later proved to have breached the GATT rules. Nevertheless, in March 1987, President Reagan announced that 100 percent tariffs would be imposed on U.S.$300 million of imports from Japan because the administration believed the 1986 agreement had been violated (Irwin 1994) . The importance given by government and policy makers to these issues was underlined further when in 1983 the CIA commissioned a major secret study of the automobile industries of the countries that were challenging the United States (Kelly 1983) .
As well as restricting imports, the Reagan administration turned its attention to promoting U.S. exports. In 1982, the U.S. Congress passed the Export Trading Company Act, which, according to Secretary of State for Commerce Malcolm Baldridge, established the principle that "exporting is now and in the future an integral part of our national economic policy" (Roberts 1983, 16) . However, the promotion of exports, a concern of the Department of Commerce, required prior identification of the specific factors that compromised the competitiveness of U.S. goods and the introduction of industrial policies to correct the shortcomings identified. To achieve this, both major companies and government turned to universities and to academics for help.
Academic interest in these issues had in any case developed in parallel because of the national importance that they had acquired. A media event that made a major contribution to this was the broadcast on 24 June 1980 by NBC of a white paper called "If Japan Can, Why Can't We?"-one of the most successful documentaries in television history (Locke 1996; Gabor 1990 ). The output of academic works on the success of Japan or on the crisis of U.S. manufacturing industry became a veritable flood. Susan Helper (1983) , in a Sloan Business Review book review, noted that "the number of books that decry the decline of the U.S. economy threatens to approach the number of Japanese imports that vex their authors" (p. 70). In 1984, another Sloan Business Review reviewer was still referring to the "tidal wave of books on Japanese corporations" and wondering whether it had "mercifully crested at last" (Maital 1984, 77) . However, Japanese management and manufacturing methods continued to be a major preoccupation of elite U.S. institutions, particularly those that had close relationships with the industries in crisis. In 1980, MIT set up its International Motor Vehicle Programme of research into the automobile industry, supported by a number of major corporations, including the big three U.S. car manufacturers. This program initiated in 1984 a major U.S.$5 million research project that culminated with the publication in 1990 of probably the most famous work on Japanese car manufacturing developing the concept of lean production, the book by J. P. Womack et al. (1990) , The Machine That Changed the World.
Quality was identified early on as a major issue. This was helped by the fact that U.S. academic thinking on quality was perceived to have played a major role in the development of the successful Japanese management methods. Both managers and universities now turned to the same academics, and to others working on similar lines, to help them learn the lessons. The father figures of the quality movement, previously marginal in their home country, now became the "gurus" of U.S. management thinking. NBC's "If Japan Can, Why Can't We?" documentary had highlighted Deming's work, his influence on Japanese management methods, and the gains made by computer and office equipment manufacturer Nashua Corporation after it became the first U.S. corporation to adopt his ideas. Following its broadcast, Ford invited Deming to visit the company and appointed him as a consultant. Deming's philosophy was formally adopted by Ford in May 1981. Deming became so much in demand as a consultant that he was able to turn down invitations from major corporations such as Chrysler for lack of time (Gabor 1990 ).
While quality now moved to the center of academic, management, and government concern, a common approach had not yet been developed. The major quality gurus agreed on many points but disagreed on others. The overall concept of TQM finally took shape as result of a Reagan government and U.S. Congress initiative (Warner 1996) derived from the initial decision in 1982 to support an export drive. The Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Improvement Act of 1987 established an annual U.S. Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award, modeled on Japan's Deming Prize but setting out the criteria that became generally associated with TQM. The purpose of the award was to promote national awareness about the importance of improving quality in products and to recognize quality achievements of U.S. companies. In 1990, the award was extended to cover service industries and small businesses. The seven criteria on which the award is judged are (1) leadership, (2) strategic planning, (3) customer and market focus, (4) information and analysis, (5) human resource focus, (6) process management, and (7) business results. The purpose of the criteria is to strengthen U.S. companies' competitiveness. According to a 1997 description of the award, the criteria are built on a set of core values and concepts that include customer-driven quality, leadership, continuous improvement and learning, employee participation and development, fast response, design quality and prevention, long-range view of the future, management by fact, company responsibility, and citizenship and results focus (http://www.eccb.org/award.htm, downloaded on 14 November 1999). It was these core values and concepts more than any detailed prescription that subsequently spread quickly around the globe.
The Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award had a major impact on the diffusion of the concept of TQM throughout U.S. industry. The naming of the award after the U.S. secretary of state of commerce, killed that year in a riding accident, is symbolic of the intimate relation between the development of the concept and the role of global U.S. economic interests.
Part 3: The Diffusion of TQM
TQM quickly became an accepted focus of U.S. management thinking, and the concept was taken up, developed, and diffused by universities. Academic publications with total quality management in the title multiplied greatly through the early 1990s. National and international conferences dedicated to the concept became regular events. There is considerable evidence that TQM can be seen partly as a fad, a result of a particular set of historical circumstances that has been more recently superceded.
1 The fad that contained elements of Japanese thinking and practice and was derived largely from manufacturing industry peaked in the early 1990s and has been more recently overtaken by others, more purely American, such as business process reengineering, which better reflect both renewed U.S. dominance and the increasing importance of service industries in the advanced economies.
The core values and concepts, however, have been retained and continue to dominate business ideology.
During the same period in which the TQM concept was being developed, the relationship between major U.S. universities and U.S. multinational corporations had been greatly strengthened, particularly through the business schools. The business schools became financially increasingly dependent on multinational corporation support as sponsors, benefactors, and customers. This process did not take place without some soul searching on the part of academics since this close relationship clearly threatened the traditional core values of universities, such as their independence and academic freedom. Nevertheless, as in this period universities were also being subject to cuts in public funding and being encouraged by government to seek closer relationships with private enterprise and greater "relevance," the pressure to respond to the needs of the multinationals became irresistible. Business school curricula increasingly focused on providing narrowly focused courses and programs for practicing executives and managers. The curricula and mode of delivery of M.B.A.s, the staple product of the business schools, also gradually changed from a largely academic focus to one prioritizing practical application and case studies. The M.B.A. also became largely a postexperience qualification. This process was mirrored in Europe, where the business schools had in any case been set up in the post-World War II period in the image of their U.S. predecessors (Eales 1985) .
During the 1980s and in the 1990s, the weight of business and management studies in U.S. and European universities grew greatly. TQM, or its core values and concepts, became central to such studies. In this way, a new generation of managers at all levels was trained, for whom these values and concepts, through the use of words such as customer focus, teamwork, employee empowerment, multiskilling, and flexibility, became second nature.
Meanwhile, the elite business schools of the United States, so important in the development of TQM, 2 followed the globalization of the multinational corporations that they had helped to theorize. They became increasingly instrumental in forming directly or indirectly the business elites of many countries, including those of what had been previously known as the Third World. Studying in the U.S. business schools became a highly prestigious passport to a remunerative and powerful employment position at home. At the same time, the business schools developed an extensive global network of contacts. For instance, MIT's Sloan Business School currently runs an intensive twelve-day executive education program in which "senior executives examine leading-edge management practices and trends, develop ways to apply them in a Latin American context, and establish a personal network of relationships" (http://mitsloan.mit.edu/global/latinamer.html, downloaded 2 October 1999). The program is a joint initiative of MIT Sloan, Monterrey Institute of Technology of Mexico, the Catholic University of Chile, the Pontifical Catholic University of Argentina, and the University of São Paulo. MIT Sloan also has a joint three-week program with the India Institute of Management, Bangalore, for Indian senior executives and for the executives of multinational companies with significant interests in India. It is designed to prepare executives to take advantage of the recent deregulation and liberalization of the Indian economy and "refocuses them on global challenges" (http://mitsloan.mit.edu/global/india.html, downloaded 21 December 2001).
Bangalore is the center of the fast-growing and export-oriented Indian software industry where nearly one hundred high-technology multinationals such as Texas Instruments, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Motorola, Siemens, and Groupe Bull have subsidiaries (D'Souza 1996) .
Conclusion
This global cultural diffusion of a concept that was born as a part of a process of developing a strategy to defend U.S. interests has been simultaneously accompanied by an assault on the line that has traditionally separated public service from private profit. While TQM and its "customer focus" might make some sense as a recipe for a company producing products for the market, the concept has subsequently been a central plank of the ideological attempt to reduce the whole of society to no more than a set of market relations. Its spread in the 1990s to public service institutions such as universities, supported by private enterprise and government agencies armed with concepts developed by academic business and management studies that have themselves gained increasing weight in the internal affairs of many Western universities, has been part and parcel of this process (Bensimon 1995; Birnbaum 2000) . In the 1990s, following the collapse of communism and after the Asian crisis of 1997, U.S. capitalism reigns once again almost unchallenged. It is also a period when the divisions between the haves and the have-nots, both internally in each country and at the global level, have greatly increased, arguably partly as the result of the spread of the management methods and accompanying values we have discussed (Head 1996) . As we have tried to show through the history and the political economy of the concept of TQM, this process can only be understood holistically as a result of a dynamic interaction between economics, politics, and culture in which the relevant institutions are major actors. Universities have played a major role as developers and diffusers of concepts that have helped to perpetuate and increase social inequalities at the global and local levels. They can and should be playing the opposite role. A necessary step in this direction is a spirited defense by academics of their own core values and concepts of independence, academic freedom, and critical thought.
